The Adomako case has certainly stimulated some very erudite discussion on the subject of manslaughter. On the pages which follow, Lord Williams and Ann Curnow give their opinions, both as to what the law is and to how it may be interpreted. Both put their point of view with consummate skill and clarity. It would be foolhardy to attempt to contribute anything to that question. There is, however, a tangent along which it might be interesting to travel. The law and legal processes exist to serve society and it is doubtful whether society has been well served by the Adomako judgment.
A good everyday method, if not legally perfect, of recognizing the extreme of negligence required for it to be considered criminal, is to ask 'Did the accused Give A Damn?'. The man who gets drunk and drives his car through crowded streets does not Give A Damn. Someone entering a signal box and altering signalling at random does not Give A Damn. An anaesthetist who turns off the alarms and goes to the tea room during an operation, frankly, does not Give A Damn. If as a result of these actions someone dies, manslaughter seems a reasonable charge; guilty, a reasonable verdict. Was this the situation in the Adomako case? Well, no actually, or at least most probably not.
The point about the Adomako case is that whilst there was one patient, having an eye operation, who died, there were two anaesthetists. These were both junior hospital doctors. The more senior of the two started the case. This would involve choosing the drugs and apparatus to be used, setting up intravenous lines, ensuring that connections were firm and that the alarms were set. The more compli-cated aspects of a routine anaesthetic are settled at the outset.
After surgery had started, the first anaesthetist was called away to start another anaesthetic which was regarded as too complicated for the more junior doctor who therefore came and took over the anaesthetic for the eye operation. It has been generally recognized that it was unsatisfactory that someone so junior should have to do this. This second anaesthetist had nothing to do with setting up the apparatus, turning on the alarms or securing the connections. During eye operations, unlike ENT operations for example, the head of the patient is very seldom moved. It is therefore extremely unlikely that securely connected tubes will come apart. Nevertheless, a disconnection did occur, depriving the patient of oxygen. The second, more junior, anaesthetist failed to recognize this and the patient died.
At the coroner's court, these anaesthetists disagreed over two important matters. The anaesthetist who started the case maintained that the ventilator alarm, which would warn of a disconnection and might well have saved the patient's life, had been turned on at the beginning of the anaesthetic and also that he personally had seen the second anaesthetist in the refreshment room after that doctor had taken over the case. Dr Adomako said that the ventilator alarm had not sounded, that he had not turned it off and that he had not left the operating theatre. The coroner, in passing the papers to the Crown Prosecution Service, indicated that he had major concerns over the quality of the evidence which he had heard.
Dr Adomako was subsequently charged with two counts of perjury. He was also charged with manslaughter. For this charge to succeed, some aspect of his behaviour should have shown that extreme of negligence which is under debate. There were two possibilities. He might have left the patient unattended or he might have switched off a potentially life-saving alarm which had previously been switched on. These, indeed, were the aspects of the case which had led to him being charged with perjury and both these suggestions relied entirely on the evidence of the anaesthetist who started the anaesthetic: a person who might possibly fear that some of the blame for the disaster would be laid at his door and who could be wondering whether he actually remembered on this particular occasion to carry out all his usual precautions. 'Did I turn the gas ring off?' one wonders as one reaches the airport.
Up to and throughout the trial at the Old Bailey no corroboration either for Dr Adomako leaving the patient or for him turning the ventilator alarm off was ever found. None of the people in the operating theatre had seen him either leave or return. People who had been in the refreshment room had not seen him. So much so that the judge, whilst stopping short of actually directing the jury to acquit on the perjury charges, strongly emphasized that corroboration was necessary to convict. From the viewpoint of common sense and logic, even if not legally, the manslaughter case should also fail at this point. It had largely been the impression that Dr Adomako was lying on oath and had left the patient unattended which had started the criminal process and this impression was now found to have no support in law.
Dr Adomako admitted that he was negligent not to have discovered the disconnection. He admitted panic in his reaction to the crisis. Nevertheless, it would be a severe critic who would claim that he didn't Give A Damn. According to the evidence, this junior doctor, who had been working extremely long hours, who had been required to take over a case generally seen as beyond the expertise of his grade, was anything but idle. He was giving atropine and more atropine. He was taking the blood pressure over and over again. He was feeling for the pulse, replacing an intravenous cannula and was by all accounts extremely worried by the course of events -ineffective certainly, but hardly fiddling while Rome burned.
So why on earth did the jury convict? Perhaps they, in spite of the lack of corroboration, gained the impression that Dr Adomako had left the patient unattended and had switched off an important alarm. Perhaps, in part, the verdict may also have been due to the Great Court Room Demonstration. The defence should probably have stuck to the suggestion that the ventilator alarm had never been switched on. After all which is more likely: that someone forgets to switch an alarm on or that someone deliberately turns it off when it is in use? If, however, the alarm had genuinely been set at the beginning, there was another possibility. The disconnection might have occurred in such a way that the loose tubing had been obstructed by the surgical drapes. It was possible that sufficient pressure might be generated in the anaesthetic circuit to prevent the alarm being activated. When the defence put this possibility, the jury requested a demonstration. The demonstration was unconvincing. The jury, correctly directed by the judge as to the importance of corroboration when considering a perjury charge and therefore effectively unable to convict on these counts, returned a verdict of guilty to the only remaining charge.
In cases of this kind, probability presents a problem. Before the operation, to suggest a round figure, the patient had perhaps one chance in ten thousand of dying. So when the case reached court, the unlikely had already occurred. The combination of probabilities of the various occurrences must equal the probability of the whole. To say that something is unlikely to have occurred is consequently a much weaker argument than it sounds. It is, paradoxically, likely that the unlikely has happened. It is unfortunate that an unconvincing demonstration in court of a possibility which it was difficult to reproduce should lead to the jury deciding that it was unlikely and therefore dismissing it. The recording of a guilty verdict, however, strongly suggests that the uncorroborated evidence which was insufficient in law to secure a perjury conviction, had in effect been used instead to achieve a manslaughter conviction.
It must be obvious that society is not well served by the imposition of a prison sentence on a doctor whose demonstrable failings were to disagree with a colleague's account of events and to panic under difficult circumstances. It would surely be more suitable if his right to practise were curtailed or withdrawn with no prison sentence passed. Dr Adomako was, however, found guilty of manslaughter and his appeal was dismissed on a balance of legal niceties.
The rest of us? Well perhaps, quite frankly, we don't Give A Damn. R. v.Adomako [19951 1 AC 171. 
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